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Abstract
Automatic speaker verification (ASV) systems are sub-
ject to various kinds of malicious attacks. Replay, voice
conversion and speech synthesis attacks drastically degrade
the performance of a standard ASV system by increasing its
false acceptance rates. This issue raised a high level of in-
terest in the speech research community where the possible
voice spoofing attacks and their related countermeasures
have been investigated. However, much less effort has been
devoted in creating realistic and diverse spoofing attack
databases that foster researchers to correctly evaluate their
countermeasures against attacks. The existing studies are
not complete in terms of types of attacks, and often difficult
to reproduce because of unavailability of public databases.
In this paper we introduce the voice spoofing data-set of
AVspoof, a public audio-visual spoofing database. AVspoof
includes ten realistic spoofing threats generated using re-
play, speech synthesis and voice conversion. In addition,
we provide a set of experimental results that show the effect
of such attacks on current state-of-the-art ASV systems.
Index Terms: spoofing, countermeasure, replay attack,
speech synthesis, voice conversion, speaker verification
1. Introduction
Over the last years, a lot of progress has been seen in the
study of face and voice biometrics. With the successful use
of deep neural networks [26] and i-vectors [6, 17] that take
advantage of the increasing data volume, current state-of-
the-art face and speaker recognition systems are able to ef-
fectively deal with intra-class and inter-class variability. As
a matter of fact, many automatic face recognition or speaker
verification systems are made available in operational use
for a wide range of applications. However, the prevalent us-
age of those systems raised some security concerns, since
a copy or an artificial sample of face/voice biometrics can
easily be reproduced to “fool” the identity verification sys-
tems.
A number of literature studies in automatic face [4, 11]
and speaker [2, 30, 27] verification showed the vulnerabil-
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Figure 1: Standard ASV system and eight possible weak
links. Attacks could be [1]: A1) Fake biometric, A2) replay
attacks, A3) override feature extractor , A4) synthetic fea-
tures/samples, A5) override matcher , A6) changing model,
A7) intervention to the channel, A8) override output.
ity of the state-of-the-art systems to the spoofing attacks.
These findings led to the increase of interest on the spoof-
ing topic in the biometrics research community. Moreover,
anti-spoofing challenges for face [5], and voice1 biometrics
are launched to promote more interest in the spoofing/anti-
spoofing research.
The findings in (anti-)spoofing research, including the
countermeasure techniques are however based on in-house
spoofing attacks. As a result, they are prone to be biased
and need to be tested in a standard and comparative way.
For researchers to fairly and “quickly” evaluate their sys-
tems towards spoofing attacks and to propose more general-
ized countermeasures, a spoofing database covering a large
number of attacks is of key importance. Recently, efforts
have been made to create such databases where the attacks
targeting face and speaker verification systems are consid-
ered. In this study, we focus solely on spoofing automatic
speaker verification systems.
To the best of our knowledge there are only few exist-
ing speech spoofing databases. In [31, 33], voice conver-
sion and replay attacks are generated using the RSR2015
database [19]. In [32], a number of speech synthesis and
1http://www.spoofingchallenge.org
voice conversion techniques are implemented. In [18, 25],
attacks based on various voice conversion methods are gen-
erated. However, none of them includes simultaneously all
the types of attacks, namely replay, speech synthesis and
voice conversion. Another drawback of these databases is
the fact that they only provide the logical access (i.e. fea-
ture level, type A4) simulations and do not comprise the
physical access (i.e. sensor level, type A2) case, which con-
stitutes more realistic scenarios (see Fig. 1). Furthermore,
the lack of different recording sessions can be observed in
some of these databases, or the lack of adequate number
of subjects can be observed in others. These are the main
reasons that hinder the generalization of both spoofing and
anti-spoofing techniques.
In this paper, we introduce a unique spoofing database
that includes all the types of spoofing attacks. This database
is expected to constitute a reliable benchmark for voice
spoofing techniques and countermeasures, since it includes
wide diversity in terms of sessions, environmental setups
and acquisition devices, and various spoofing scenarios
within challenging conditions. Additionally, we provide the
physical access simulations, i.e. the replayed form of the
speech synthesis and the voice conversion attacks, which
brings another novelty compared to state-of-the-art work.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 briefly presents the state-of-the-art ASV systems.
Section 3 describes the data and methods used for creating
the attacks. Section 4 shows the experimental results for
ASV systems with and without countermeasures. Finally,
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Automatic Speaker Verification
Automatic speaker verification is regularly evaluated by
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)2
since 1996 in the context of the NIST speaker recogni-
tion evaluation (SRE) series. During this series, many
techniques have been proposed such as Gaussian mixture
models (GMM) [24], inter-session variability (ISV) mod-
eling [28], joint factor analysis (JFA) [15], or recently, i-
vectors [7]. One common thread with current successful
state-of-the-art approaches is their ability to cope with ses-
sion variability that mainly comes from acoustic environ-
ments and communication channels.
In this study, two of the above techniques are evaluated
in terms of spoofing vulnerability: ISV and i-vectors.
ISV aims to estimate session variation like noise in order
to compensate for it. It is assumed that session variability
results in an additive offset to the mean super-vector gi of
the client model. Given the j-th utteranceOi,j of a speaker
i the mean super-vector µi,j of the GMM is:
µi,j =m+Uxi,j +Dzi , (1)
2http://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/mig/sre.cfm
(a) Microphone (b) Phone1 (c) Phone2
Figure 2: Devices used for speech data acquisition.
where m is the GMM mean super-vector of the universal
background model (UBM), U is a subspace that constrains
the possible session effects, xi,j is its associated latent ses-
sion variable (xi,j ∼ N (0, I)), while D and zi represent
the client-specific offset.
The total variability modeling aims at extracting a low-
dimensional factor wi,j , called “i-vector”. It relies on the
definition of a total variability subspace T and can be de-
scribed by:
µi,j =m+ Twi,j , (2)
The i-vector approach only acts as a front-end extractor and
does not perform session compensation or scoring. Thus,
several techniques are commonly applied to i-vectors such
as whitening [10], length-normalization [10], linear dis-
criminant analysis (LDA) [9], within-class convariance nor-
malization (WCCN) [12], probabilistic linear discriminant
analysis (PLDA) [23].
3. Realistic Voice Spoofing Attacks
3.1. Common Set-up
The AVspoof database 3 is intended to provide stable,
non-biased spoofing attacks in order for researchers to test
both their ASV systems and anti-spoofing algorithms. The
attacks are created based on newly acquired audio record-
ings. The data acquisition process lasted approximately two
months with 44 persons, each participating in several ses-
sions configured in different environmental conditions and
setups. After the collection of the data, the attacks, more
precisely, replay, voice conversion and speech synthesis at-
tacks were generated.
The data acquisition process is divided into four different
sessions, each scheduled several days apart in different se-
tups and environmental conditions (e.g. different in terms of
background noise, reverberation, etc.) for each of 31 male
and 13 female participants. The first session which is sup-
posed to be used as training set while creating the attacks,
was performed in the most controlled conditions. Besides,
the conditions for the last three sessions dedicated to test
trials were more relaxed in order to grasp the challenging
3https://www.idiap.ch/dataset/avspoof
Session 1 Session 2-4 Total
read 40 sentences 10 sentences 25.96 hours
pass 5 pass-phrases 5 pass-phrases 4.73 hours
free ≥ 5 min. ≥ 3 min. 38.51 hours
Table 1: The statistics of the collected data in terms of ses-
sion, recording type and acquisition device.
scenarios. The audio data were recorded by three different
devices (Fig. 2) including (a) one good-quality microphone,
AT2020USB+, and two mobiles, (b) Samsung Galaxy S4
(phone1) and (c) Iphone 3GS (phone2) .
The positioning of the devices was stabilized for each
session and each participant in order to standardize the
recording settings.
For each session, the participant was subjected to three
different data acquisition protocols as in the following:
• Reading part (read): 10/40 pre-defined sentences are
read by the participant.
• Pass-phrases part (pass): 5 short prompts are read by
the participant.
• Free speech part (free): The participant speaks freely
about any topic for 3 to 10 minutes.
The number, the length, as well as the content of the
sentences for the reading and pass-phrases part are care-
fully selected in order to satisfy the constraints in terms of
readability, data acquisition and attack quality. Similarly,
the minimum duration of the free speech part is also deter-
mined according to our preliminary investigations mostly
on the voice conversion attacks for which the free speech
data would be included in the training set. Please refer to
Table 1 for the statistics of the collected data.
3.2. Attacks
In the spoofing attack creation phase, we considered cre-
ating spoofing trials for the text-dependent utterances of the
testing data, i.e. reading parts of sessions 2-4 and the pass-
phrases of all four sessions. As a preliminary step before the
creation of the attacks, the speech data originally recorded
at 44.1 KHz sampling rate is down-sampled to 16 KHz.
There are four main spoofing attacks for ASV systems:
Impersonation, replay, speech synthesis and voice conver-
sion [8]. As the impersonation is known not to be a serious
threat for ASV systems [8], we did not include it in our
database. For the remaining three spoofing types, we de-
signed ten different scenarios (see Table 2). We gave special
attention to physical access attacks. These attacks are more
realistic than logic access attacks considering the fact that
the attacker often has no direct access to the system. The
acquisition devices (sensors) are open to anyone, therefore
more subjected to such attacks.
Attacks
Num. of
trials per
speaker
Total num.
of trials
Male Female Male Female
Replay-phone1 50 50 1,550 650
Replay-phone2 50 50 1,550 650
Replay-laptop 50 50 1,550 650
Replay-laptop-HQ 50 50 1,550 650
Speech-Synthesis-LA 35 35 1,085 455
Speech-Synthesis-PA 35 35 1,085 455
Speech-Synthesis-PA-HQ 35 35 1,085 455
Voice-Conversion-LA 1,500 600 46,500 7,800
Voice-Conversion-PA 1,500 600 46,500 7,800
Voice-Conversion-PA-HQ 1,500 600 46,500 7,800
Table 2: Number of spoofing trials per gender.
3.2.1 Replay Attacks
A replay attack consists of replaying a pre-recorded speech
to an ASV system. We assume that the ASV system has a
good quality microphone and the replay attack targets this
sensor. Three different scenarios are considered:
• Replay-phone1: Replay attack using the data captured
by the Samsung mobile. The speech recorded by
this mobile is replayed using its own speakers and re-
recorded by the microphone of the ASV system.
• Replay-phone2: Replay attack using the data captured
by the iPhone mobile. The speech recorded by this mo-
bile is replayed using its own speakers and re-recorded
by the microphone of the ASV system.
• Replay-laptop: Replay attack using the data captured
by the microphone of the ASV system. The speech
recorded by this microphone is replayed using the lap-
top speakers and re-recorded again by the microphone
of the system.
• Replay-laptop-HQ: Replay attack using the data cap-
tured by the microphone of the ASV system. The
speech recorded by this microphone is replayed using
external high-quality loudspeakers and re-recorded us-
ing the microphone of the ASV system.
3.2.2 Speech Synthesis Attacks
The speech synthesis attacks were based on statistical para-
metric speech synthesis (SPSS) [38]. More specific, hid-
den Markov model (HMM)-based speech synthesis tech-
nique [36] was used. Today, HMM-based speech synthe-
sis produces very high quality synthetic speech, sometimes
achieving even higher performance than unit-selection con-
catenation synthesis [38]. In this approach, a unified HMM
framework is used to simultaneously model the spectrum,
fundamental frequency and segment duration, creating a
mapping between the input (linguistic) features and the
output (acoustic) features. Additionally HMM-based syn-
thesis with the use of adaptation and interpolation tech-
niques [35], [22], offers flexibility in changing speaker’s
and voice characteristics, speaking style, emotions, etc.
In this paper, the HTS version 2.1 toolkit [13] was used
for building the HMM models. Specifically, the implemen-
tation from the EMIME project [29] was taken. Five-state,
left-to-right, no-skip HSMMs (hidden semi-Markov mod-
els) were used [39]. A standard, in HMM-based speech
synthesis, set of input features was used, composed of pho-
netic and prosodic features such as phone identity, identity
of the two previous and next phones, number of syllables
in a word, accented/stressed syllable, etc., adding to a 53
feature set [37]. The speech parameters which were used
for training the HSMMs were 39 order mel-cepstral coeffi-
cients, log-F0 and 21-band aperiodicities, along with their
first and second derivatives, extracted every 5 ms. An aver-
age voice model was first built using SAT training [3] on
the SI-84 (si-tr-s) subset of the American English multi-
speakers Wall Street Journal (WSJ) corpora [20], contain-
ing of approximately 7, 100 sentences. The average voice
model was then adapted to each speaker, using 40 sentences
(i.e. Session 1-read) of the respective speaker. For the
adaptation, the constrained structural maximum a posteri-
ori linear regression (CSMAPLR) [34] approach was used.
STRAIGHT [14] was used for the analysis and synthesis
phase of the HMM-based speech synthesis.
Accordingly, three scenarios were involved:
• Speech-Synthesis-LA: Speech synthesis via logical ac-
cess. The synthesized speech is directly presented to
the ASV system without being re-recorded.
• Speech-Synthesis-PA: Speech synthesis via physical
access. The synthesized speech is replayed using the
laptop speakers and re-recorded by the microphone of
the ASV system.
• Speech-Synthesis-PA-HQ: Speech synthesis via high-
quality physical access. The synthesized speech is re-
played using external high-quality loudspeakers and
re-recorded by the microphone of the ASV system.
3.2.3 Voice Conversion Attacks
The voice conversion attacks were created using Festvox4.
A conversion function for each pair of source-target speaker
is found based on the learned GMM model/parameters by
using the source and target speakers training data. We did
not consider cross-gender voice conversion attacks, that is
only male-to-male and female-to-female conversions were
4http://festvox.org
taken into account. As in the case of speech synthesis, three
possible scenarios are involved:
• Voice-Conversion-LA: Voice conversion via logical ac-
cess. The converted speech is directly presented to the
system without being re-recorded.
• Voice-Conversion-PA: Voice conversion via physical
access. The converted speech is replayed using the
speakers of the laptop and re-recorded by the micro-
phone of the ASV system.
• Voice-Conversion-PA-HQ: Voice conversion via high-
quality physical access. The converted speech is re-
played using external high-quality loudspeakers and
re-recorded by the microphone of the ASV system.
4. Experimental Results
In this section, we evaluate the vulnerability of the ASV
systems introduced in Section 2 under the various types of
spoofing attacks. In all our experiments5 we use Spear [16],
an open-source speaker recognition tool based on Bob6. For
both ISV and I-Vector systems, the same voice activity de-
tection (VAD), feature extraction and UBM training steps
are performed. For VAD, the modulation of the energy
around 4Hz is applied. A 60-dimensional feature vector
is constructed for each speech utterance. This vector in-
cludes 19 MFCCs and the energy, with their first and sec-
ond derivatives. The UBM parameters are estimated using
the MOBIO database [21], with 256 Gaussian components.
The subspace dimension of the ISV system is set to 50. As
for TV system, the dimension of i-vectors is set to 100 while
the rank of LDA and the dimensions of the intra and inter
speaker covariances of the PLDA model are all set to 50.
Table 3 illustrates the results of the ISV and TV systems
without spoofing scenarios. It shows that the ISV results are
better than TV results on both Male and Female trials. This
might be due to the relatively small amount of training data
used to train the subspace models of the TV system.
Table 4 shows the spoofing false acceptance rates
(SFAR) of both ISV and TV systems with regards to each
of the spoofing attacks. It is clear that all attacks give rise to
high SFARs for both ISV and TV systems. More specif-
ically, the speech synthesis and voice conversion attacks
seem to be very effective in spoofing the ASV system. For
instance, the speech synthesis presented directly (i.e. logi-
cal access) to the TV-based system can produce a SFAR of
96.5% on Male trials and 81.5% for Female trials.
It is also worth noting that the ASV system is vulnera-
ble to physical access attacks although the SFAR rates are
lower than those of logical access attacks. For example, in
5This study is reproducible using this package: https://pypi.
python.org/pypi/xspear.btas2015
6http://www.idiap.ch/software/bob/
Male Female
ISV TV ISV TV
Threshold 0.597 43.97 0.690 44.63
EER (%) 4.9 6.9 10.6 17.5
Table 3: Performance of the ISV and TV systems with nat-
ural speech (i.e. without spoofing attacks).
Attack type Male Female
ISV TV ISV TV
Replay-phone1 19.2 29.1 12.2 11.8
Replay-phone2 45.9 27.7 23.1 11.1
Replay-laptop 45.3 39.8 35.7 32.2
Replay-laptop-HQ 74.1 77.4 68.5 69.4
Speech-Synthesis-LA 97.0 96.5 83.5 81.5
Speech-Synthesis-PA 65.9 60.6 67.9 69.5
Speech-Synthesis-PA-HQ 94.1 93.5 83.7 83.7
Voice-Conversion-LA 93.4 92.6 71.2 71.6
Voice-Conversion-PA 77.4 84.0 50.7 75.8
Voice-Conversion-PA-HQ 89.3 88.8 73.0 73.0
Table 4: Verification performance of the ISV and the TV
systems under spoofing attacks. SFAR (%) are computed
using the thresholds given in Table 3.
the case of Speech-Synthesis-PA, that is, speech synthesis
attacks replayed with normal laptop speakers, the SFAR is
60.6% instead of 96.5% on Male trials for a TV-based sys-
tem. However, interestingly, the physical access attacks that
are replayed with high-quality loudspeakers have spoofing
rates close to the logical access attacks. For example, this
is the case for Speech-Synthesis-PA-HQ with a SFAR of
93.5% for a TV-based system on Male trials.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we provide an experimental study on the
vulnerability of ASV systems to realistic spoofing attacks.
We introduce AVspoof, a public audio-visual spoofing
database that includes ten realistic voice spoofing threats
generated using replay, speech synthesis and voice conver-
sion attacks. We also provide a set of experimental results
that show the effect of these spoofing attacks on two state-
of-the-art ASV systems. Future work will mainly focus on
generalized countermeasure that can effectively deal with
the various types of attacks presented in this study.
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